Major changes to State Council offer new opportunities and challenges

By Josef Gregory Mahoney

The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012 saw the elevation of Xi Jinping and a new generation of leadership with a mandate of new reforms. That same year, a widely discussed book by Pierre Landry was published, Decentralized Authoritarianism, which used empirical research to illustrate how the Party had successfully empowered local governments to improve development and governance while nevertheless maintaining effective central controls. The title proved to be a convenient term that also gained currency among some scholars to describe another trend—the proliferation of ministries and bureaus at the local and national levels that could at times be at odds with each other. While some of these tensions were seen as positive, for example, ecological protection vs. commerce and energy, which in some cases providing official pushback against other official plans that might undermine environmental protection, they also ran the risk of increasing confusion, red tape, and inaction in both government and society.

The fifth plenary meeting of the first session of the 13th National People's Congress (NPC) is held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China, March 17, 2018. [Photo: Xinhua]

Reforms from the 19th National Congress of the CPC late last year and the recent meetings that followed it, including the Party’s Third Plenary and the state’s ‘two sessions’—the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—have endorsed a major reshuffle of cabinet-level portfolios. While the Party has made it clear that it will continue to empower but also better supervise local governance institutionally, the second meaning of the term “decentralized authoritarianism” may soon be a less apt description of national governance practices. 

Official reports indicate that going forward there will be 26 ministries and commissions on the State Council, including new ministries for natural resources, veterans’ affairs, and emergency management, and administrations overseeing immigration, banking and insurance, and international development cooperation. Restructuring will also streamline by consolidating and reconciling differences between multiple offices affecting a particular area of interest. The number of ministerial-level entities will be reduced by eight, those as the vice-ministerial-level will drop by seven, producing in some cases what have been described unofficially as “super-ministries,” including those devoted to health, environmental protection, culture and tourism, and agriculture and rural affairs, among others. The stated aim is to create more coherent approaches to policymaking and regulation, thereby improving governance related to economic management, market supervision, social management, public service, and ecological and environmental protection.

On the one hand, these reforms present as logical steps forward, and straight away aim to reconcile differences that inevitably arise in regulation, oversight and development. Such problems are present in even the most advanced countries, and China’s system has certainly not yet reached the pinnacle of such development, as Xi Jinping has made clear in two lengthy published volumes discussing the need to reform Chinese governance. At the same time, such reforms always accompany a fast developing society and economy like China’s. Additionally, the Chinese political system is one that requires a certain amount of centralization, otherwise it can stumble into unmanageable disarray and while providing poor service. Therefore, in some cases recentralization can serve as a type of renewal, particularly in a new era that is marching to the tune set by changing conditions and needs.

On the other hand, looking at China’s long history and comparing it with others, no other country has proven a greater civilizational capacity to over-bureaucratize, frequently to the point of self-paralysis with respect to the ability to advance meaningful reforms and progress. There will be at least three major challenges going forward.

First, one of the advantages of previous looseness is that it allowed for some flexibility that some believe empower change and development, particularly given differences that affect China by locality.  

Second, therefore, will better-centralized governance ultimately disempower local governance, contrary to aims to advance the same? In short, how will the new system retain the positive consequences of such flexibility and local empowerment while mitigating the possible negatives? Will so-called super-ministries become bureaucratic monoliths? 

Third, Xi often talks about building “innovative governance,” one that also fosters innovation in society.  In some direct cases, for example, the reforms affecting regulation of intellectual property rights indicate clear benefits for encouraging innovation. Additionally, improving governance by making it more rational is usually rewarded by the market. In particular, investors and decision-makers considering new product development and other market moves want above all to know what the rules are and see them enforced consistently. Nevertheless, these new reforms, particularly the consolidations and elevations that have created new and super-ministries might produce organizational structures that have more power than ever before. Again, as history indicates, the general tendency of bureaucracy is to place itself increasingly above the people it purports to serve, as every Chinese leader since Mao Zedong has understood and struggled to address, as these reforms also aim to address in part. 

In recent years, as a matter of publicizing streamlining and better service, senior leaders have frequently attend exhibitions where official seals (gong zhang) are retired. Thus, vigilant oversight and supervision that can transcend such tendencies will be vital for restraining that always-lurking potential for self-defeating “improvements.” How to create innovative governance across the board that also encourages innovation, therefore, will be a major question going forward.

(Josef Gregory Mahoney is Professor of Politics and Director of the International Center for Advanced Political Studies at East China Normal University in Shanghai.)