Why the SCO is the most important forum on security in Asia

By Harald Buchmann

The BRICS summit, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), One Belt One Road… the number of initiatives by China to shape Asia and the world is growing, and it may be difficult to see the relationship between them. The difference between these frameworks for cooperation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is that the SCO extends beyond the economic and cultural spheres into the realm of security cooperation, primarily in three areas:

1. Traditional security threats like terrorism, extremism, and separatism;

2. Cyber security threats, namely using social media to destabilize a society by spreading disinformation and anti-government rhetoric; and

3. Military cooperation, by conducting joint drills with armed forces from different SCO members participating, under the observation of all SCO members.

A woman walks past an installation in Qingdao, east China's Shandong Province, June 3, 2018. The 18th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit is scheduled for June 9 to 10 in Qingdao. [Photo: Xinhua]

This third aspect of cooperation has gained further great importance since 2017, when both Pakistan and India were admitted as full members of the SCO. Tensions between the nuclear armed countries, especially in the Kashmir region, are well known. India and China have also had their lot of border disputes, including alleged cross-border military excursions. That these three countries are having summits regularly, and discussing cooperation on security and joint military exercises and trust building, can only be welcomed by the world. No sane government would start a war between nuclear powers, so the biggest threat of war comes from misunderstandings and a lack of trust. To have regular forums for exchange at the head-of-state level as well as defense- and foreign-relations level, can do a lot to build trust, enhance communication, and reduce tensions.

Where the SCO is heading will be an interesting question for the future. When it was founded, some interpreted it as a counterbalance to NATO – a military defense pact. Then there is the long-term goal of reaching a free-trade zone over the whole territory of the SCO, which would be reminiscent of the pre-E.U. European Community. With the admission of India and Pakistan, the dominance of China and Russia within the SCO has been counter-balanced. While some analysts still claim that the ultimate goal of the Belt and Road Initiative is China's dominance of Central Asia, the development of the SCO gives a strong indication against such a view. If China wanted to stay in full control of the SCO, then clearly India would not be admitted. It seems the SCO is indeed intended as a multilateral, multipolar forum for dialogue. This is little surprise if one has followed statements by the SCO founding partners and believed in them. But it is good to see that concrete actions are in line with the lofty ideals, as it is easy to proclaim mutual respect and cooperation on a superficial level, but very hard to give up actual power and influence in order to live up to these ideals.

The take-away from all this is that Chinese-centered institutions are indeed designed to be multi-lateral constructs. The AIIB has transparent voting rights, which don't favor China. The SCO is willing to admit powerful new members, which can balance Chinese dominance. And for the Belt and Road Initiative, the logical lesson for India should be that joining in could be much more lucrative than opposing it. India has historically always been an important trading hub along the Silk Road. Modern India has a lot to offer economically and to gain from free trade between Asia and China. And with its location, India can play an important role in the still fragile security framework in Central Asia.

Although there is no formal relationship between the Belt and Road Initiative and the SCO, obviously the two international cooperation frameworks do overlap. The SCO includes economic cooperation and cultural exchange. And the Belt and Road Initiative relies on security for trade relationships to prosper. The difference is in the level of interaction, but countries can very well be in the SCO and participate in the building of the Belt and Road. A cultural exchange event between Tajikistan and China, for example, could be labeled a Belt and Road event, or an SCO event – or even both.

We should observe how China handles the development of the SCO, AIIB, and the Belt and Road Initiative. It looks as though China is willing to create new institutions that are open to all qualified applicants, and which can be shaped by all participants. This will be of great importance for these institutions to gain bigger support among more and more nations. If nations have the choice of being protected by the United States only so long as they follow orders from the United States, or can be in charge of their own safety in a powerful cooperation framework with China, India, and Russia – which they can influence themselves as well – surely very few nations will still choose to follow the American model of international cooperation. The Trump administration has dropped the veils of shame when it comes to bossing around other nations. This is a good time for the SCO to raise its voice louder, and to become more self-confident and prominent within Asia.

(Harald Buchmann is a Swiss economic analyst and business advisor based in Beijing)