The China story: the case of Northern Europe

By Kerry Brown and Sharon Matejka

The Belt and Road Initiative sprang from an idea that China's President Xi Jinping used firstly when speaking in Jakarta, Indonesia in mid-2013, and then when travelling through the Central Asia region a little later the same year. At that time, the name for the idea was the more poetic `New Silk Road.' But this was changed in 2014 to the `One Belt One Road' and finally, a year later, to the `Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).'

The reason why this idea is so important is simply that it is the first time that China has unilaterally announced a major global vision. This is something that has been requested by the rest of the world for a number of years. Now it has emerged. The outside world has at least some idea of what the answer to the complex question, `What does China want?' might be and how it might relate to them.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Finnish counterpart Sauli Niinisto meet skaters' representatives from the two countries in Helsinki, Finland, April 5, 2017. [Photo: Xinhua]

The most important aspect of this story is that it is a genuinely global one and it signifies China’s global ambitions and relevance. The BRI as it is called consists of two strands - a land route and a sea one. The sea one stretches down through South East Asia, right to the coast of Australia and New Zealand. The land one reaches through Central Asia to the Middle East, up to Central and Eastern Europe. It is supported by entities like the Chinese initiative Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank which has a start-up capital of USD200 billion, and now has over 56 members. It also has a flexible framework where the main priorities are to support connectivity, in terms of information, finance, human movement and trade.

One of the fascinating aspects of the BRI is the ways in which it has reached into parts of the world that have never before seriously considered engaging more intensely with China’s domestic economy and its outward investment. The Nordic states typify this. They seem very peripheral to China. And yet, there are ways in which they can consider how it might impact on them. It is clear that two of the main interests on the Chinese side are to work in the space of e commerce and business, and to find opportunities for major infrastructure projects. Countries do not need to be formally part of the BRI zone to try to be involved in this. They can also be associated with it, and aim for knock on benefits.

One area is through the Chinese ambition to build high speed rail and other infrastructure. Already a goods train has passed from the UK to coastal China, taking 17 days, carrying goods to sell in the People's Republic. There are ways in which this sort of phenomenon will impact on Northern Europe. It is certainly something that neighbouring countries from Latvia, to Poland, to Hungary and those in southern Europe are interested in.

At the moment, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland have limited links with China. Large companies like Maersk or Ericson have had some success there - but these are the exceptions rather than the rule. Chinese investment into the region too has been restricted to big ticket projects like Volvo (even though that was bought from an American owner, the company has major interest in Northern Europe). There is no compelling narrative for the region and its links with China. This is partly because Northern European countries have never thought much about this narrative. But also because China has never proactively presented something to which they might respond.  The BRI offers the opportunity to change this. 

Other regions are trying to use the BRI to supply this sort of narrative of Chinese relevance. Xi Jinping has been called the `chief storyteller of China'. And the story he is telling is carried by big ideas like the BRI. But to work they need a corresponding narrative in the countries where the idea is going. For the UK, for instance, the story is around `the Golden Age'. Northern Europe also needs a similar story that it can tell about where, and how, Chinese investment and partnership matter to it. If it doesn't find these, then it positions itself in a very problematic space where almost all those around it are discovering this story, but it remains silent. 

The main takeaway for the BRI in northern Europe is therefore very simple: how does it use this to create its own unique China narrative. And once that is done, how this will create a better quality, upgraded relationship. It is examples like this that show that these day, no matter where you are, you need to seriously think of your own China Story. 

(Kerry Brown is Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau China Institute at King's College, London; Sharon Matejka is a Sweden-based researcher.)