Historical truth behind U.S. Open Door policy toward China

China Plus Published: 2018-10-26 15:45:31
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By Yue Bin

Note: This is a translation of a Chinese-language article first published by Xinhuanet.com. The article reflects the author's own views.

In what was seen as the Trump administration’s first major policy speech on China, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence berated Beijing for a series of so-called wrongs, and hailed his country’s historical policy towards China. In his address, Pence said that, “When China suffered the insults and exploitations during her so-called ‘Century of Humiliation,’ America refused to join in, and instead advocated an “Open Door” policy, with the aim of developing freer trade with China, and preserving its sovereignty.” His words gave the impression that the United States had chosen not to join the ranks of the colonial powers and Japan in their aggressions at the time, but instead had acted to protect China’s sovereignty. 

[Photo:IC]

[Photo:IC]

If that were true, the Chinese people would be giving the United States a big thumbs up. But the facts of history suggest otherwise. It’s not strictly true, as Mr. Pence suggested, that the US “refused to join in” with the imperial powers.” If that were so, then how did the inequitable Treaty of peace, amity, and commerce between the United States of America and the Chinese Empire come about in 1844? And what about the unequal China-U.S. Treaty of Tianjin in 1858?And where did the U.S. troops, found among the Eight-nation Alliance that attacked China in 1900, come from? Perhaps we should examine more closely that Open Door policy and consider whether it really was designed to “preserve” China’s sovereignty”. 

By the end of the 19th century, the West was embracing monopoly capitalism, with trade in the hands of just a few people. After the Jiawu Sino-Japanese War from 1894 to 1895, the colonial powers scrambled to partition China. From 1897 to July of 1898, Germany forced the lease treaty of the Jiaozhou Bay and took Shandong as its territory; Tsarist Russia leased Lvshun Port, Dalian Bay and its surrounding waters to make northeastern China part of its territory; France leased Guangzhou Bay and its surrounding waters, colonizing Guangdong, Guangxi and Yunnan; Great Britain occupied Weihaiwei and controlled areas along the Yangtze River; Fujian fell to the might of Japan. Almost all of China’s strategically important, populous and economically advanced areas had been claimed. And yet, the United States was nowhere to be seen. 

Why was that? Among the big capitalist powers, the United States was a latecomer. When it was first founded at the end of the 18th century, it was comprised of only 13 states along the Atlantic coast. Its territory soon expanded, and in 1861 a 4-year civil war broke out when southern states broke away to protect the institution of slavery. After the civil war the United States rebuilt and expanded to become an economic powerhouse. Even so, it did not have the might to invade Asia until it became a world power by the end of the 19th century. The United States fought Spain over the Philippines in 1898, but it was not an easy victory. By the time it turned its attention to China, it was already too late. The United States wasn’t strong enough to rival more powerful countries such as Great Britain and France to take territories away from them. So, it looked elsewhere and set its sights on the Sandu Gulf - a natural deep water port in Fujian Province. A U.S. navy official inspected the area and was of the opinion that, whoever controls this gulf controls the entire western Pacific; If the United States were to take possession then the Pacific Ocean would become a lake of the United States. However, Italy was also taking a keen interest, and both Germany and Britain wanted it too. These countries squabbled over the territory, with none wishing to back down, so in the end it was ceded to no one. So, it’s not that the United States didn’t want territories in China, it was simply not strong enough to get any. To quote the Chinese philosopher Mencius, “It’s because it can’t, rather than won’t.” 

So the United States went for the next best option. To protect its commercial interests in China, it came up with its Open Door policy, the principles of which were as follows: No nation shall interfere in the sphere of influence of another in China; None shall favor their own traders at the expense of those from other nations in transportation levies; and the territorial status quo shall be maintained, safeguarding equal and free trade throughout China. To put it bluntly, it required all powers to allow US goods to enter any part of China unhindered.

So, it’s clear that the Open Door policy had no impact on the influence of the colonial powers in China in any way, nor did it alleviate the “indignities and exploitation” China suffered. The only thing the United States cared about with its Open Door policy was that its own interests in China should not be harmed in any way. What Mr. Pence sees as a policy to “preserve China’s sovereignty” was more aimed at protecting the interests of the United States while China was being carved up by others. To be fair, compared to the other powers consuming China at the time, the United States looks more attractive, but that was something neither to celebrate nor be grateful for.

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LU Xiankun Professor LU Xiankun is Managing Director of LEDECO Geneva and Associate Partner of IDEAS Centre Geneva. He is Emeritus Professor of China Institute for WTO Studies of the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) and Wuhan University (WHU) of China and visiting professor or senior research fellow of some other universities and think tanks in China and Europe. He also sits in management of some international business associations and companies, including as Senior Vice President of Shenzhen UEB Technology LTD., a leading e-commerce company of China. Previously, Mr. LU was senior official of Chinese Ministry of Commerce and senior diplomat posted in Europe, including in Geneva as Counsellor and Head of Division of the Permanent Mission of China to the WTO and in Brussels as Commercial Secretary of the Permanent Mission of China to the EU. Benjamin Cavender Benjamin Cavender is a Shanghai based consultant with more than 11 years of experience helping companies understand consumer behavior and develop go to market strategies for China. He is a frequent speaker on economic and consumer trends in China and is often featured on CNBC, Bloomberg, and Channel News Asia. Sara Hsu Sara Hsu is an associate professor from the State University of New York at New Paltz. She is a regular commentator on Chinese economy. Xu Qinduo Xu Qinduo is CRI's former chief correspondent to Washington DC, the United States. He works as the producer, host and commentator for TODAY, a flagship talk show on current affairs. Mr. Xu contributes regularly to English-language newspapers including Shenzhen Daily and Global Times as well as Chinese-language radio and TV services. Lin Shaowen A radio person, Mr. Lin Shaowen is strongly interested in international relations and Chinese politics. As China is quite often misunderstood in the rest of the world, he feels the need to better present the true picture of the country, the policies and meanings. So he talks a lot and is often seen debating. Then friends find a critical Lin Shaowen criticizing and criticized. George N. Tzogopoulos Dr George N. Tzogopoulos is an expert in media and politics/international relations as well as Chinese affairs. He is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre International de Européenne (CIFE) and Visiting Lecturer at the European Institute affiliated with it and is teaching international relations at the Department of Law of the Democritus University of Thrace. George is the author of two books: US Foreign Policy in the European Media: Framing the Rise and Fall of Neoconservatism (IB TAURIS) and The Greek Crisis in the Media: Stereotyping in the International Press (Ashgate) as well as the founder of chinaandgreece.com, an institutional partner of CRI Greek. David Morris David Morris is the Pacific Islands Trade and Investment Commissioner in China, a former Australian diplomat and senior political adviser. Harvey Dzodin After a distinguished career in the US government and American media Dr. Harvey Dzodin is now a Beijing-based freelance columnist for several media outlets. While living in Beijing, he has published over 200 columns with an emphasis on arts, culture and the Belt & Road initiative. He is also a sought-after speaker and advisor in China and abroad. He currently serves as Nonresident Research Fellow of the think tank Center for China and Globalization and Senior Advisor of Tsinghua University National Image Research Center specializing in city branding. Dr. Dzodin was a political appointee of President Jimmy Carter and served as lawyer to a presidential commission. Upon the nomination of the White House and the US State Department he served at the United Nations Office in Vienna, Austria. He was Director and Vice President of the ABC Television in New York for more than two decades.